Nation needs to understand Ethos of Forces
Uttarakhand Disaster- A Test Case
Brig Chander Thapa(Retd)
The devastation in Uttarakhand because of cloudbursts that occurred on night of 15th/16th June 2013 and heavy rainfall thereafter is unprecedented. Until June 27, rainfall was 1250mm, nearly 4 times the average monthly rainfall of 328mm for June, leaving a heavy trail of death, destruction and devastation in its wake. While official sources give figures of under 1000 dead and around 2500 missing, as per unofficial, but conservative, estimates the actual toll is likely to exceed 5000. The devastation saw 154 bridges and 1520 km of road destroyed and upwards of 2200 houses wrecked or obliterated. Over one lakh pilgrims found themselves trapped.
Normally the Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) is provided on specific request by appropriate civil authroties (Collector, Distt Commissioner, etc). However, realising the gravity of the situation the Army’s Area Headquarter, located at Bareilly reacted well before being asked to do so. Commanded by a 3-star General Officer, it mobilised on 17th June and relocated to Dehradun from where it started functioning early next day. Simultaneously, it passed orders to its units to relocate immediately for rescue missions.
The units responded with typical military precision and alacrity, underlying in the process the true nature of military leadership, which leads from the front. As an example, on the 17th itself, after an aerial reconnaissance, a unit was ordered to move to Kedarnath, establish its command & communications post there and report readiness to the Area Commander. This occurred at a time when the civil administration was not even fully aware of the scale of devastation. The commanding officer moved forthwith, reaching Kedarnath with his unit and reported readiness by the 18th complete with command and control elements to the Area Commander. The Commanding Officer was the first to reach Kedarnath.
Paradoxically, at this time his counterparts in the civil administration were being evacuated to safety!
The message from military commanders was clear. At a critical time, four flag officers were available at dangerous places in the mountains of Garhwal where civil administration had ceased to exist. This helped greatly in the subsequent rescue missions with decision makers available on the spot and mutually coordinating the rescue efforts. The Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command also provided a sterling example of front line leadership, when on 26 June he walked with the stranded passengers, leading them to safety. How many leaders walk their talk?
The Army’s reaction was quick and efficient. While exact figures are not important, ballpark figures show initial deployment of over 5000; the number gradually getting increasing to around 8500 within a week. With more assistance sought in the form of support for engineering tasks, such as, construction of bridges and repair to roads the strength will only go up. The Air Force and Army Aviation contributed nearly 40 helicopters, civil aviation nearly a dozen. The ITBP initially contributed a battalion (about 700 personnel), building this up later to two battalions. The NDMA contributed around 300 personnel in the initial days of the rescue and now its strength stands further increased to around 500. By 27June the relief effort was 1820 sorties, 15,311 evacuated by helicopter (possibly the largest ever air evacuation using only helicopters) and nearly 1,05,000 evacuated by temporarily laid out land routes.
The tragedy has shown up the top-heavy nature of the NDMA, overstaffed with high-ranking officials sitting in Delhi, but woefully short of functional elements at the ground level. That the Army moved in as first respondents instead of the NDMA tells its own tale.
The Indian state deploys the Armed Forces whenever the chips are down. Where ever this has happened, the army, navy & air force are known to deliver results. But whereas the armed forces understand the concept of civilian supremacy, in return the Indian state has paid scant attention to understanding the ethos of the services.
The ethos of the armed forces, namely service before self, leadership from the front, mission accomplishment against all odds and transparency in all its dealings, have been under acute national media scrutiny. Continuous live media coverage by the print and visual media has brought home to the Indian public both the unfolding tragedy and the role the Armed Forces are playing in its mitigation. There has been universal praise for the efficiency and selfless bravery of its personnel, which speaks volumes of their ethos.
This factor is little understood as the services are shy away of presenting their achievements. For them mission accomplishment remains the sole aim and not its publicity. This has led to a wide information & perception gap. The all encompassing work ethos of a 300 year old organisation is brushed under the carpet, by politicians, and babus as it helps paper over their own inadequacies.
In 2012, a large number of us retired veterans took part in a seminar organised by Uttarakhand Sub Area Head Quarters on the role of the Army in the floods of 2011. Members of the civil bureacracy were also present. But it seems the civil administration picked up nothing, learnt no lessons. It attended the seminar and slept over the proceedings of the seminar. As a result it continues to rely almost exclusively on the Army and other paramilitary forces, such as ITBP, to pull them out of disaster situations.
A weakness of the Armed Forces lies in its recording of events. Each unit dutifully records the role it played in disaster mitigation in its war diaries and subsequently a consolidated list of lessons learnt will emerge. The work culture of the Forces will treat this as merely a part of duty. The collective history of this great achievement is unlikely to be placed in a single report that records for posterity the story behind the facts and figures .
The Forces need to record in full, the collective effort of commanders and troops at all levels so that the nation remembers and knows what took place at such a tragic time in our history. It is time Dehradun Sub Area records this collectively for posterity and not lessons learnt alone. The forces need to let the nation know how they surmount almost impossible odds in service of the country. This will raise the morale of the country, increase the 'value' of the services provided by the armed forces, compel desicion makers to accede to demands for specialised equipment for the jawans, airmen and sailors, and, hopefully, inspire our youth to join the Forces.
The fundamental ethos of "Service before Self" leads the military to maintain a stoic silence and treat all its actions as mere rendition of duty. But we need to record the great work done so that the nation knows, and holds up such example to the rest of the country.
The forces have a commitment to the task, the fierce single-minded obsession to accomplish the mission even at the peril of one’s life. The details that the Army goes into are painstaking, with an obsessive eye for detail. Every contingency is planned for, troops briefed, events rehearsed and special troops earmarked. In this case, people were stranded at inaccessible places and special troops were sent. As an organisation the Army mitigated the risks to ensure that those rescued were not put at risk.
Self-containment is another requirement for the forces. Each time there is a flood or a disaster, when all else are coming out the soldier is going in. Who looks after his sustenance? Evidently, he has to look after himself, and the military leadership, with its eye for detail, ensures that the soldier is self-contained for the mission. This gives the soldier the freedom to devote all his energies to the task. In addition, the soldiers are briefed of the need to be patient with the people they are assisting as these people are at the end of their tether. This makes for better understanding and compassion. Incidentally, during the Uttarakhand floods, apart from the tragic loss of 20 servicemen in a weather related helicopter accident, there were no fatalities of personnel of the armed forces involved in rescue and evacuation of civilians. This speaks volumes for the meticulous attention to detail by the field commanders as well as the training and resourcefulness of each and every soldier.
Locating people stranded at various places remained a challenge. In addition to locating the stranded by helicopters, the Army sent many young officers on foot patrol to locate pilgrims. It built bases up ahead to ensure that the choppers spend more time on doing the job at hand and less on commuting up and down. The army set up hospitals and with personnel of the Border Roads Organisation, ensured that the road axis is cleared up earliest. Even now, army personnel are deployed in large number and assisting the civil administration in command and control functions which remains a vexed problem for the latter. The poor state of infrastructure has been pointed out by the Army, but perhaps the time has come to be more forceful in talking about such issues lest we be caught wrong footed again.
Brig Chander Thapa(Retd) is a renowned defence analyst
